Abstract-In this paper, we examine the impact of enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico border on wages in U.S. and Mexican border regions. The U.S. Border Patrol polices U.S. boundaries, seeking to apprehend any undocumented entrants. It concentrates its efforts on the Mexican border. We examine labor markets in border areas of California, Texas, and Mexico. For each region, we have high-frequency data on wages and person-hours the U.S. Border Patrol spends policing the border. For a range of empirical specifications and definitions of regional labor markets, we find little impact of border enforcement on wages in U.S. border cities and a moderate negative impact of border enforcement on wages in Mexican border cities. These findings are consistent with two hypotheses: border enforcement has a minimal impact on illegal immigration, and illegal immigration from Mexico has a minimal impact on wages in U.S. border areas.
I. Introduction
A central tenet of U.S. immigration policy is the control of national borders. The U.S. Border Patrol polices international boundaries, seeking to apprehend any individual attempting to enter the United States illegally. These efforts are concentrated on the U.S.-Mexico border, where most attempts at illegal entry occur. During the last two decades, repeated economic downturns in Mexico have contributed to surges in attempts at illegal entry (Hanson & Spilimbergo, 1999) . In response to these circumstances and to growing political sensitivity about illegal immigration and control of borders more generally, the U.S. government has dramatically increased efforts to enforce the U.S.-Mexico border. 1 The number of hours that Border Patrol officers spent policing the Mexican border rose from 1.8 million in 1977 to 5.1 million in 1997.
In this paper, we examine the impact of border enforcement on wages in border regions of the United States and Mexico. We study border areas because they are the regions most directly affected by illegal immigration. Most illegal immigrants embark from a Mexican border city and choose a U.S. border state as their final destination (Bustamante, 1990; Warren, 1995) . Whatever the impact of illegal immigration, it is likely to be strongest in border labor markets. The regions we examine are southern California, southwestern Texas, and Mexican cities on the U.S.-Mexico border. For each of these regions, we have monthly (or quarterly) data on wages and on the number of person-hours that the U.S. Border Patrol spends policing border areas and the number of apprehensions its officers make while on patrol. If border enforcement is effective at impeding illegal immigration from Mexico, then its effects should be apparent in border communities. Because the intensity of border enforcement is likely to be influenced by labor-market conditions in the United States and Mexico, we treat it as an endogenous variable in the empirical analysis.
We add to a small but growing literature on illegal immigration. Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) -building on earlier papers by Bean et al. (1990) and Borjas, Freeman, and Lang (1991) -find that illegal immigration from Mexico, as proxied by apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border, is highly responsive to changes in Mexican wages and, to a lesser extent, changes in U.S. wages. 2 Related papers include case studies of illegal immigration from Mexico (Cornelius, 1992; Donato, Durand, & Massey, 1992) , estimates of the undocumented immigrant population in the United States (Warren, 1995; Van Hook & Bean, 1998) , estimates of the substitutability in labor demand between Mexican immigrants and other workers (Bean, Lowell, & Taylor, 1988) , and estimates of the sensitivity of Mexican regions to U.S. labor market shocks (Robertson, 2000) . 3 There is very little work on whether border enforcement affects labor market outcomes in the United States or Mexico. 4 This gap in the literature is unfortunate, given the importance of border enforcement in U.S. efforts to control illegal immigration.
Our work also relates to a broader literature on whether immigration lowers the wages of U.S. workers. 5 This subject has attracted attention due to the coincidence of two events: rising immigration of low-skilled individuals (Borjas, 1994 ) and a relative decline in the earnings of lowskilled U.S. workers (Levy & Murnane, 1992; Katz & Murphy, 1992) . The standard approach in the literature is to examine the correlation between changes in the wages of native U.S. workers and changes in the stock of immigrants in a cross section of U.S. metropolitan areas. 6 Most studies find that immigration has, at most, a small negative effect on the earnings of native workers.
There is doubt about whether existing research identifies the true effect of immigration on wages. Katz (1992, 1997 ) find three problems with using cross-sectional data to identify the wage effects of immigration. First, wage growth varies across regions for reasons that are unrelated to immigration. Regions that, for whatever reason, attract immigrants may have exceptional wage growth over certain periods. Without exogenous controls for other factors that contribute to regional wage growth, the cross-sectional correlation between changes in immigration and wages may be uninformative. Second, native workers may respond to an influx of immigrants in their locale by migrating to other regions, mitigating the effect of immigration on local wages. The literature is divided about whether immigrant inflows contribute to native outmigration. Filer (1992) and Borjas et al. (1997) find that it does, whereas Card (1997) finds that it does not. Third, regions may absorb immigrants without changes in wages by shifting into industries that use immigrant labor relatively intensively. In California, the arrival of immigrants from Mexico and other low-wage countries has been followed by rapid growth in apparel, textiles, food products, and other laborintensive industries (Hanson & Slaughter, 2000) . This paper helps assess the severity of the shortcomings in previous literature. Although our analysis of illegal immigration is indirect-border enforcement influences the cost of entering the United States illegally but is not the sole determinant of illegal immigraiton-our approach has several advantages. In contrast to existing studies, which mostly use cross-sectional data for U.S. regions at long time intervals, we have high-frequency time series data on wages and border enforcement in regions on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. This allows us to control for the fact that long-run trends in wage growth may vary across regions. It also means that we are able to examine both the short-run and long-run effects of border enforcement on wages, thus controlling for the possibility that the arrival of illegal immigrants in border regions may cause an outmigration of native workers or a change in the mix of production activities in local industry.
In section II, we describe the data used in the analysis. In section III, we derive the empirical model and present results in section IV. In section V, we discuss the findings. For a range of specifications and definitions of regional labor markets, we find only a weak positive correlation between border enforcement and wages in U.S. border regions and a moderate negative correlation between border enforcement and wages in Mexican border cities. These findings are consistent with two hypotheses: border enforcement largely fails to deter illegal immigration, and illegal immigration from Mexico has a minimal impact on wages in U.S. border areas.
II. Data
As motivation for our focus on border labor markets, we briefly describe the spatial distribution of legal and illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States. To examine the impact of border enforcement on the U.S.-Mexico border region, we use a combination of industry data and survey data to construct time series of wages in U.S. and Mexican border regions.
A. Border Labor Markets: Immigration and Enforcement
Mexican immigrants in the United States tend to congregate in regions near the Mexican border. Data from the 1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing show that 46.5% of Mexican-born individuals who had immigrated within the previous five years resided in the border region of California and 8.6% resided in the border region of Texas. Of all Mexican immigrants, 41.6% resided near the California border and 13.1% resided near the Texas border. 7, 8 The direct labor market consequences of Mexican immigration are thus likely to be concentrated in border areas.
Recent Mexican immigrants tend to have low levels of education relative to U.S. workers. In 1990, Mexican-born individuals in the United States who had immigrated within the previous five years had an average of nine years of education, compared to more than thirteen years for U.S. natives. Unsurprisingly, workers who are recent immigrants are most prevalent in industries that are relatively intensive in the use of less-skilled labor. Table 1 shows the share of workers who are Mexican immigrants for selected industries in California, Texas, and the rest of the United States in 1980 and 1990. We focus on manufacturing because it is this sector for which we have wage data, but we also show figures for other high-immigrant industries. For the border region of California in 1990, more than 32% of workers in the apparel, textile, food products, lumber, and furniture industries were Mexican immigrants, and a substantial fraction of these were recent arrivals. In the state as a whole, the shares of workers who are Mexican immigrants are somewhat smaller. For the border region of Texas in 1990, the fraction of workers who were Mexican immigrants was 45% in apparel, 27% in textile, 21% in food products and lumber, and 15% in furniture. Again, immigrant shares in the state as a whole are smaller. In contrast to the border, Mexican immigrants account for a small fraction of workers in these industries for the rest of the United States.
Recent Mexican immigrants include both legal and illegal aliens. Over the period 1980-1995, legal admissions of Mexican nationals by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) averaged 62,600 individuals per year. 9 Warren (1995) estimates that over the period 1982-1992 the average annual net inflow of illegal Mexican immigrants was 158,600 individuals per year. Given the legal predicament of undocumented immigrants, we expect these individuals to be even more concentrated in U.S. border cities than legal immigrants. Nearly all illegal Mexican immigrants enter the United States by crossing the U.S.-Mexico border over land, which requires them to spend at least some time in a U.S. border region. Relatively large populations of Mexican nationals in U.S. border cities may make these areas relatively attractive for undocumented arrivals. Warren (1995) estimates that, in 1992, 59.5% of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the United States resided in California and 17.2% resided in Texas.
Illegal attempts to enter the United States are concentrated along the U.S.-Mexico border. Available data are from unpublished records of the INS, which contain monthly figures for 1977-1997 on the number of individuals apprehended while attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally and the number of person-hours the U.S. Border Patrol spends policing the border. 10 Both series are broken down by nine geographic regions. 11 Apprehensions are an indirect indication of attempted illegal immigration from Mexico. Over the sample period, more than 95.0% of those apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol were Mexican nationals, and more than 99.0% of apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol occurred at the U.S.-Mexico border (U.S. INS, 1998) . Figure 1 shows border apprehensions by state over the sample period. There is a clear seasonal pattern in apprehensions (high in the summer, low in the winter), which mirrors seasonal variation in U.S. labor demand (Hanson & Spilimbergo, 1999) . Most apprehensions occur in California; San Diego alone accounts for an average of 49.5% of all border apprehensions. El Paso is the second most important site for apprehensions, accounting for an average of 18.2% of apprehensions. These two locations are near large U.S. 9 This figure excludes individuals admitted under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which gave legal status to large numbers of long-term illegal aliens.
10 Data on enforcement and apprehensions are based on the "linewatch" activities of the U.S. Border Patrol. These activities occur at international borders; other enforcement activities, such as traffic checkpoints or raids on businesses, occur in the U.S. interior. Individuals apprehended by Border Patrol officers on linewatch duty are foreign residents attempting to enter the United States illegally; individuals apprehended by officers on non-linewatch duty have been residing in the United States for an unknown period of time. For most of our work, we use data on linewatch enforcement because this measure captures enforcement efforts that are targeted at new illegal immigrants. To check the sensitivity of our empirical results to this choice, we reestimated all specifications replacing linewatch enforcement with total enforcement (linewatch plus non-linewatch) and found very little impact on our results.
11 The regions, in order from west to east, are San Diego and El Centro (California), Yuma and Tucson (Arizona), and El Paso, Marfa, Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen (Texas). (Bean et al., 1994) . Figure 2 shows monthly border enforcement hours by U.S. border state over the sample period. In contrast to apprehensions, enforcement shows no seasonal pattern and is spread more evenly across regions. San Diego accounts for an average of 28.1% of enforcement hours, and El Paso accounts for an average of 16.0% of enforcement hours. There are differences in the time path of enforcement across locations, which reflects regional variation in enforcement strategies. All locations show a rise and then a fall in enforcement surrounding the implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which mandated an increase in expenditure on border enforcement. There is a sudden rise in enforcement in Texas in early 1993, and this increase is due mainly to "Operation Hold the Line" in El Paso, during which enforcement hours more than doubled in a three-month period. 12 Following this increase, enforcement hours in Texas decline somewhat over the next three years. Enforcement hours are stable in California between 1988 and 1993 and then rise dramatically in 1994 and 1995, as attempted illegal entry increased following a currency crisis and a severe recession in Mexico and as the INS increased border patrols in San Diego as part of "Operation Gatekeeper."
B. Wages in U.S. and Mexican Border Regions
We use several sources to measure U.S. and Mexican wages. The concentration of immigrants in border regions and in specific industries suggests that the impact of immigration (and hence the impact of border enforcement) will be strongest in these regions and industries. To allow the short-run effects of border enforcement to differ from the long-run effects, it is important to use high-frequency data. It is also important to adjust for variation in worker characteristics (such as age and education) across regions and industries, which requires household-level data. Unfortunately, no data set has high-frequency observations on households with sample sizes that are large enough to allow disaggregation by education level, region, and industry. We use household-level data to measure wages by education level and region and industry-level data to measure wages by industry and region. Although neither data set is ideal, we aim to eliminate the possibility that our findings are an artifact of a particular data set by using multiple wage measures.
For data on wages in high-immigrant industries in California and Texas, we use the Current Employment Statistics Survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which gives the average hourly wage for production workers in selected industries and regions at a monthly frequency. Because production workers tend to have much lower education and pay levels than nonproduction workers, they are the workers most vulnerable to competition from illegal immigrants and hence the workers most likely to benefit from border enforcement. We examine the apparel, textile, food products, lumber, and furniture industries in California and Texas over the period 1980-1997. Data are available for individual cities within these states, but gaps in BLS data collection for individual MSAs make the available citylevel time series very short. For California, most employment in high-immigrant industries occurs in the Los Angeles area, so that California employment in these industries is a reasonable proxy for industry employment in Los Angeles. 13 We confirm that our results hold for industries in individual MSAs over given subperiods.
For data on wages in U.S. border regions by education group, we use monthly data from the Current Population 12 Following "Operation Hold the Line," there was an apparent change in border-crossing strategies by illegal immigrants from Mexico trying to enter Texas. For a detailed discussion, see Bean et al. (1994) . 13 Over the sample period, the share of California employment in the Los Angeles-Long Beach MSA is 72% in the apparel industry, 66% in the textile industry, 63% in the furniture industry, 28% in the food products industry, and 19% in the lumber industry. 15 For data on wages in Mexican border regions, we use quarterly data from the Mexican National Urban Employment Survey (ENEU), which covers approximately 96,000 households in eight major urban areas. Included in the sample are Mexico's two largest border cities, Ciudad Juarez (which neighbors El Paso) and Tijuana (which neighbors San Diego), both of which are major crossing points for illegal immigrants. Data are available for the period 1987-1997.
Given the relatively low education levels of recent immigrants, the effects of immigration are likely to differ across skill groups for workers in both the United States and Mexico. To control for this possibility, we follow recent literature (see footnote 6) by calculating the age-adjusted mean wage for four education categories in each border region, in each time period. To do so, we estimate the following regression separately for each time period:
where w ht is log real earnings for individual h in period t, D hit is a dummy variable for whether individual h belongs to age group i, E hjkt is a dummy variable for whether individual h has education level j and resides in region k, the ␤ it 's and the ␥ jkt 's are parameters to be estimated, and ⑀ ht is an i.i.d. error term. 16 The ␥ jkt 's are age-adjusted mean wages for different education groups in different regions, which we use as dependent variables in subsequent analysis.
For both the CPS and the ENEU, the individuals included in the sample are non-self-employed, nonmilitary males aged 16-64 who worked at least twenty hours in the survey week. We include dummy variables for five age groups: 16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64 . For CPS data, we estimate region-education dummy variables for five regions (border cities in California, nonborder areas in California, border cities in Texas, nonborder areas in Texas, and the rest of the United States) and four education categories (high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate). For ENEU data, we estimate regioneducation dummy variable for four regions (Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, other border cities, and interior cities) 17 and four education categories: 0-6 years (primary), 7-11 years (secondary), 12-15 years, and greater than 15 years. 18 Figures 3 and 4 show average hourly wages for highimmigrant industries in California and Texas, relative to wages for the same industries in the United States as a whole. 19 Although real wages decline in each industry, there are also relative wage declines in California textiles and lumber and Texas food products. Figures 5 and 6 show age-adjusted mean wages of high school dropouts and high school graduates in California and Texas border cities, relative to those for the corresponding education group in the rest of the United States. Wages for both high school dropouts and high school graduates in California tend to be higher than in the rest of the nation, but they decline in relative terms over the period. Wages for both education 14 In 1990, the share of Mexican-born individuals in the population varies in California from 7.6% in San Diego to 13.5% in Los AngelesLong Beach, and in Texas from 2.7% in Austin to 25.8% in McAllen. 15 Monthly CPS data are available for the period from January 1979 to December 1996. Due to changes in classification codes for MSAs, there are no MSA identifiers in the data for the periods July-December 1985 or June-August 1995. In order to use a continuous time series, we are limited to the intervening period. State identifiers exist in CPS data for all months. We use both samples in our analysis. 16 For CPS data, the wage is usual weekly earnings deflated by the U.S. CPI for the current month; for ENEU data, the wage is usual monthly earnings deflated by the Mexican CPI for the current month. 17 The other border cities are Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo. The interior cities are the country's three largest cities: Guadalajara, Mexico City, and Monterrey. 18 The education categories for Mexico group individuals with similar skill levels, as indicated by average earnings. There are spikes in the distribution of schooling at six years (primary school), nine years (secondary school), and twelve years (preparatory school). Relatively few individuals complete sixteen or more years of schooling.
19 Given age-adjusted mean wages are estimated coefficients from log wage regressions, the relative wages we show in figures 3 through 6 are the log difference of the two relevant series. Figure 7 shows age-adjusted mean wages for individuals with primary (0-6 years) education and secondary (7-11 years) education for Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana; wages are relative to those for the corresponding education group in interior Mexico. Wages are high relative to interior cities, but decline over time.
III. Empirical Specification

A. Empirical Model
In this section, we present a simple model of how border enforcement influences labor markets in border regions. We use the model to derive a reduced-form specification for border wages as a function of border enforcement and national labor-market conditions. The starting point for the analysis is the idea that wages in border regions will be affected by three factors: the migration of labor between regions within a country, the immigration of labor from neighboring countries, and local shocks. We assume that labor markets are competitive, that labor is mobile across regional and national boundaries, and that workers migrate towards regions with higher wages. For simplicity, the model treats labor as homogeneous, although we relax this assumption in the estimation. All variables are expressed in logs, and time subscripts are suppressed.
We imagine that wages in U.S. border region b, w b , are related to employment in the region, N b , and an unobserved i.i.d. local disturbance to labor demand, ⑀ b w , as follows:
Employment in U.S. border region b will be the sum of locally employed workers who are legal residents, L b , and locally employed workers who are illegal immigrants from Mexico, M b :
Legal workers migrate towards U.S. regions that offer higher wages, such that their employment in border region b is a function of local wages, national U.S. wages, w n , and an unobserved i.i.d. local disturbance to the supply of legal
We assume that illegal immigrants from Mexico enter the U.S. labor market through the border region. Border en- 
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forcement partially impedes illegal immigration. Potential illegal immigrants view apprehension by the U.S. Border Patrol as costly because detention by U.S. authorities implies time out of the labor force and may impose other material or psychic costs (Hanson & Spilimbergo, 1999) . 20 The supply of illegal workers to border region b then depends on wages in region b, wages in Mexico, w m , the level of enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico border, E, and an unobserved i.i.d. local disturbance to the supply of illegal immigrants in region b, ⑀ b M :
U.S. authorities are likely to set border enforcement taking expected illegal immigration into account. For instance, the U.S. Border Patrol may raise (lower) border enforcement when U.S. wages rise (fall) relative to Mexican wages because these wage movements would be expected to generate more (fewer) illegal attempts to cross the border. Other factors are also likely to influence border enforcement, such as the U.S. political climate and other demands on border-enforcement resources (for example, enforcement against smuggling of contraband). Border enforcement can then be expressed as a function of expected illegal immigration from Mexico, M E , political and resource constraints on enforcement, Z, and an unobserved disturbance, ⑀ E :
The goal of the empirical estimation is to uncover the effect of border enforcement on labor market conditions in border regions. Because we lack repeated observations on the supply of illegal immigrants in U.S. border regions, M b , we cannot estimate the full system of equation (2) through (6). An alternative approach is to combine equation (2) through (5) to obtain a reduced-form expression for wages in U.S. border region b:
where is a constant. By estimating equation (7), we can identify the reduced-form effect of border enforcement of wages in U.S. border regions:
Under standard assumptions, the coefficient in equation (8) would be unambiguously positive: stronger border enforcement would raise U.S. border wages. These assumptions are that labor is subject to diminishing returns (␣ 1 Ͻ 0), that border enforcement lowers the supply of illegal immigrants in U.S. border regions ( 3 Ͻ 0), and that the own-price elasticity of labor supply is positive (␦ 1 Ͼ 0 and 1 Ͼ 0). One obvious concern about estimating equation (7) is that, by equation (6), border enforcement is likely to be correlated with unobserved shocks to border wages (⑀ b w , ⑀ b L , and ⑀ b M ). This raises the possibility that the OLS estimate of the border-enforcement effect in equation (8) would be inconsistent. 21 We deal with this problem by instrumenting for border enforcement in the estimation of equation (7). We discuss instrument selection in the next section.
In the absence of valid instruments, an alternative would be to take a less structural approach and estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) for border wages, border enforcement, and Mexican wages (under the testable assumption that labor market conditions in the rest of the United States are not influenced by these variables). We could then see whether future realizations of border wages are correlated with past realizations of border enforcement. In unreported results, we implemented this strategy and obtained results that are consistent with those that follow. We do not report these results in the paper because we have doubts about the assumptions required for a VAR to uncover the effect of border enforcement on labor market outcomes in border regions.
In a manner analogous to that specified in equation (7), wages in Mexican border regions are likely to be influenced by wages elsewhere in Mexico, wages in the United States, or enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico border. Increased border enforcement is expected to put downward pressure on wages in Mexican border cities because Mexican border regions are the point of departure for illegal emigration to the United States. Stronger border enforcement would increase the supply of labor in Mexican border cities and thus depress wages. We also estimate a specification of wages in Mexican border cities, similar to that in equation (7).
B. Estimation Issues
Several estimation issues need to be addressed. A first issue is that the model in equation (7) is static, but, given moving costs or other frictions, adjustment to labor-market shocks is likely to take several periods (especially with observations at monthly frequencies). We deal with this issue by estimating a dynamic extension of equation (7) in which we include lagged dependent variables and lagged values of control variables as regressors.
A second estimation issue relates to the selection of instruments for border enforcement. We instrument for enforcement using the following variables: a dummy for whether there is a U.S. congressional election in the 20 Border enforcement may reduce illegal immigration either directly (by leading to the apprehension of those that attempt illegal immigration) or indirectly (by deterring individuals in Mexico from attempting to enter the United States illegally). 21 Unfortunately, it is difficult to sign the bias because enforcement is likely to be positively correlated with labor demand shocks (⑀ b w ) and migration shocks (⑀ b M ) but negatively correlated with labor supply shocks (⑀ b L ).
upcoming calendar year, the value of the U.S. Customs user fee, boat arrivals at the Los Angeles-Long Beach International Port, the number of travelers entering the United States from Canada (by land, air, or sea), and the estimated value of illegal drug seizures by the U.S. Border Patrol in the given fiscal year. The first four variables are at a monthly frequency; the fifth variable is at an annual frequency. It is worth discussing the rationale for each instrument. The timing of congressional elections would be correlated with border enforcement if politicians manipulate the allocation of public spending in election years to improve their electoral prospects. In this case, the budgeted resources available to the U.S. Border Patrol would follow a political cycle. The customs user fee is an ad valorem duty on the value of imports, which ranges from 0% to 0.21% over the sample period. A higher fee may induce some individuals to smuggle goods into the United States rather than importing them legally. All else equal, more smuggling may lead the Border Patrol to substitute resources away from apprehending illegal immigrants and towards catching smugglers. More Los Angeles-Long Beach port activity implies fewer resources available for enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico border if, all else equal, more boat arrivals mean more inspections to be performed by the Border Patrol. A similar logic applies to the number of travelers going to and from Canada. Finally, more illegal drug seizures may imply more resources devoted to searching for illegal drug shipments and fewer resources available for border enforcement. As additional instruments, we use lagged values of control variables (U.S. wages, Mexican wages, and U.S. unemployment rate). 22 We check the validity of the instruments in two ways. To verify that the instruments are correlated with border enforcement, we report the results of F-tests on the instruments in the first-stage regression (of enforcement on the instruments and the exogenous regressors in equation (7)). To verify that the instruments are uncorrelated with shocks to border wages, we also report tests of overidentifying restrictions on the instruments (Newey, 1985) .
A third estimation issue is that in equation (7) we implicitly assume that U.S. wages, Mexican wages, and any other control variables are exogenous to wages in the U.S. border region and to border enforcement. This assumption is based on the idea that border labor markets are small in relation to the national economies of the United States and Mexico. To verify that this assumption of exogeneity is warranted, we estimated a VAR for the full set of variables included in the estimation and then performed tests of block exogeneity for U.S. national wages, Mexico national wages, and other control variables such as the U.S. unemployment rate, in which we tested the null hypothesis that lagged values of border wages and border enforcement are uncorrelated with the assumed exogenous variables (Hamilton, 1994) . For all measures of border wages, we failed to reject the null at any reasonable level of significance. 23 A fourth estimation issue is that illegal immigration may create a spurious correlation between border enforcement and wages in U.S. border regions. To the extent that illegal immigrants earn lower wages than residents of the United States, their entry into the U.S. labor force will lower measured average wages in the United States, even if they have no effect on the wages of existing U.S. residents. If lower levels of border enforcement allow higher levels of illegal immigration, there may be a spurious positive correlation between U.S. wages and border enforcement. Although such compositional effects are likely to be small in high-frequency data, we still control for this problem by excluding potential illegal immigrants from the sample. In estimating equation (2) on CPS data, we exclude from the sample all individuals that describe themselves as born in Mexico and not U.S. citizens. 24 This unfortunately eliminates some long-term Mexican residents, both legal and illegal, from our data, but it helps reduce the impact of compositional effects on our data. 25 We are unable to control for compositional effects in BLS industry wage data.
A final estimation issue arises from the fact that for some specifications (those relying on wage data from the CPS or ENEU) we measure wages using coefficient estimates from the regression in equation (1). These coefficient estimates appear as dependent variables in equation (7). By construction, the disturbance term in equation (7) will include a sampling error that has a nonconstant variance over time. We use the White (1980) estimator to obtain heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. A further problem is that some specifications include lagged values of the dependent variables as regressors. By using constructed regressors, we may introduce measurement error into the estimation. One solution would be to instrument for lagged dependent variables. Valid instruments, in this case, are difficult to find because we need variables that are correlated with the first 22 We also experimented with using other variables as instruments that were plausibly correlated with border enforcement and uncorrelated with labor-market conditions in U.S. and Mexican border regions. These included electoral cycles in U.S. border states and cities, climatic conditions in U.S. border cities, and U.S. federal workdays. These variables did not have strong simple or partial correlations with border enforcement. 23 These results are available upon request from the authors. 24 We exclude individuals who define themselves as "Mexicanos" from the sample. (We recognize that it would be more desirable to exclude just recent Mexican immigrants form the data because this class of individuals contains a relatively large fraction of undocumented workers, but our data unfortunately do not identify an individual's year of entry into the United States in all sample years.) The CPS uses three categories for persons of Mexican descent, Mexican-American, Chicano, and Mexicano. These are "write-in" categories and thus not necessarily subject to strict definitions. Nonetheless, Mexican-Americans are generally believed to be U.S. citizens of Mexican descent, Chicano is an alternative term for U.S. citizens of Mexican descent used mostly by the cohort of individuals who were young adults in the 1970s and 1980s, and Mexicano appears to be used mostly by Mexican-born individuals who are not U.S. citizens. 25 In unreported regressions, we estimated wage equations in which the wage measures were based on samples of U.S. workers that included Mexicanos. These results are quite similar to those that we report in table 5, suggesting that compositional effects are not too important in our data. These results are available on request.
several lags of wages but uncorrelated with contemporaneous shocks to wages (at monthly frequencies). 26 We address this problem by examining the sensitivity of our results to changing the measure of wages that is used. Some specifications, notably those using BLS industry wage data, are not subject to the same concerns about errors in the regressors.
IV. Empirical Results
In this section, we examine the relationship between enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico border and wages in U.S.
and Mexican border regions. Table 2 gives variable definitions and summary statistics for the regression variables. For the United States, we examine wages in high-immigrant industries in California and Texas, and wages of male high school dropouts and high school graduates in California and Texas border cities; for Mexico, we examine wages for males with primary and secondary education in the two largest border cities, Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez.
As an informal indication of the relationship between wages and enforcement, figures 8 through 11 show crosscorrelograms for border enforcement and each measure of border wages, where all series are detrended. These graphs plot the correlation between log border wages and leads and lags of log border enforcement. If enforcement does effect wages, we would expect to see a positive correlation between wages and lags of enforcement in U.S. border regions and a negative correlation between wages and lags of 26 An alternative approach would be to use the variance of the estimated coefficients from the first-stage regression in equation (1) as an estimate of the variance on the measurement error on the generated regressor in the second-stage estimation of equation (7), which is similar to orthogonal regression. In unreported results, we applied such techniques to CPS data. Because the coefficient estimates we obtained were implausible (negative values for coefficients on the first lag of dependent variables), we do not report them here. 
DOES BORDER ENFORCEMENT PROTECT U.S. WORKERS FROM ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION?
enforcement in Mexican border regions. Without additional controls, however, these raw correlations are only a rough indication. Figure 8 shows that, in the California food products, apparel, and lumber industries, there is a positive correlation between wages and border enforcement, which peaks at two to four lags of enforcement. This is weakly consistent with the hypothesis that border enforcement leads border wages. For Texas border industries, shown in figure 9, there is a similar relationship between wages and enforcement in lumber and furniture. There is also a positive correlation between wages and enforcement in apparel, but it peaks for the contemporaneous correlation. There is zero correlation between wages and enforcement in food products and textiles. Turning to wages for high school dropouts and high school graduates in California and Texas border cities, shown in figure 10, we see zero or negative correlations between wages and enforcement. Finally, figure 11 shows cross-correlograms for Mexican border cities. There is a negative correlation between wages and enforcement in all cases that peaks at six to eight leads to enforcement, suggesting that wages lead enforcement rather than the reverse. These figures fail to show consistent evidence that border enforcement influences wages. The regression results confirm this finding.
A. High-Immigrant Industries in California and Texas
Tables 3 and 4 report OLS and IV regression results, using industry wages in border states as the dependent variable. Data are monthly, and the time period is March 1980 to September 1996. We examine whether there is a statistically significant correlation between wages in U.S. border industries and lagged values of border enforcement.
Wages are the log of average hourly real wages for production workers in the food products, textiles, apparel, lumber, or furniture industries in California or Texas. Border enforcement is the log of total enforcement hours in Border Patrol sectors along either the California or TexasMexico border. The additional control variables are log wages for the U.S. industry as a whole, log real average hourly wages for manufacturing workers in Mexico, and the state unemployment rate. We instrument for border enforcement with contemporaneous and lagged values of months 
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until a U.S. congressional election, the U.S. customs user fee, Los Angeles port activity, U.S. travelers to and from Canada, and the value of U.S. drug seizures, as described in the previous section. All regressions include monthly dummy variables, a time trend, and two lags of the regressors. 27 The top panels of tables 3 and 4 report OLS results for California and Texas. Complete results for California are in appendix tables A1 and A2. For brevity, we do not report complete results for other samples; these are available on request. The first row of each panel shows the estimated long-run elasticity of wages with respect to border enforcement. The border-enforcement elasticity for wages is statistically insignificant in all cases but the Texas lumber industry. Because this elasticity depends on coefficient estimates for the lagged dependent variable as well as for border enforcement, the precision with which it is estimated may not accurately reflect the partial correlation between wages and enforcement. To address this issue, the second row in each panel shows an F-test on the sum of coefficients for enforcement, which represents a test of the null hypothesis that there is no long-run correlation between wages and enforcement. In OLS regressions, we fail to reject this null in all cases. 28 In the bottom panel of tables 3 and 4, we present the results for instrumental variable regressions. We first discuss the validity of our instruments. The third row of the bottom panel in tables 3 and 4 report F-tests on the instruments in the first-stage regressions (where border enforcement is the dependent variable and the exogenous regressors and the instruments are the independent variables). The instruments appear to be correlated with border enforcement in both California and in Texas. They are jointly statistically significant at the 5% level. The fourth row reports results for tests of overidentifying restrictions (Newey, 1985) . In all cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms in the IV regressions at any reasonable significance level. 27 Two lags on the regressors was generally the specification that minimized the value of the Schwarz criterion. 28 In unreported results, we examine the short-run impact of border enforcement on wages by testing the null that the coefficients on border enforcement are jointly zero. The results for this test are the same as for the long-run impact.
FIGURE 9.-CROSS-CORRELOGRAMS: ENFORCEMENT AND WAGES IN TEXAS INDUSTRIES DOES BORDER ENFORCEMENT PROTECT U.S. WORKERS FROM ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION? 83
The first row in the IV panels of tables 3 and 4 reports IV estimates of the long-run elasticity of border enforcement with respect to wages, and the second row reports the F-test on the sum of coefficients for border enforcement. Similar to the OLS regressions, border enforcement is statistically insignificant in most cases, the exceptions being lumber in California and Texas. The precision of the estimates aside, it is worth noting that the estimated effect of enforcement is negative in three of five industries in California and in one of five industries in Texas. For the cases in which border enforcement is precisely estimated, it is important to ask whether its effect on industry wages is economically important. The long-run elasticity of wages with respect to border enforcement is 0.088 is California lumber and 0.131 in Texas lumber. This impact is small, and the economic 
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impact is also likely to be small given that lumber is one of the smallest manufacturing industries in either state.
In unreported regressions, we examine the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications and sample periods. We experiment with altering lag lengths on the regressors, using national in place of regional measures of border enforcement, replacing California industry wages with industry wages for the Log Angeles-Long Beach MSA (where Mexican immigrants are highly concentrated), dropping observations after the devaluation of the peso in 1994 (which was followed by a severe recession in Mexico), adding apprehensions of individuals at the border as a regressor, and using additional instruments. None of these changes impact the results. Border enforcement has at most a small, positive, and imprecisely estimated impact on border industry wages.
For completeness, we also estimated wage equations similar to those reported in tables 3 and 4 for the California and Texas chemical and transportation equipment industries, which are relatively intensive in skilled labor and appear to employ relatively few undocumented workers. 29 29 In 1990, the employment share of recent Mexican immigrants was 4.0% in California chemicals, 1.5% in California transportation equipment, 0.2% in Texas chemicals, and 0.4% in Texas transportation equipment (compare to table 1). Observations are monthly for March 1980 to September 1996, for a total of 199. Complete results are in appendix tables A1 and A2. The industry wage (the dependent variable) is log real average hourly wages for production workers in California. Border enforcement is log officer hours by the U.S. Border Patrol in sectors along the California-Mexico border. The exogenous regressors are log real U.S. industry wages, log real wages for production workers in Mexican manufacturing, the state unemployment rate, a time trend, and monthly dummy variables. All specifications include as regressors two lags on the dependent and independent variables. The top panel reports OLS results, and the bottom panel reports IV results, both with Huber-White standard errors. The long-run effect is the estimated long-run elasticity of state wages with respect to border enforcement (sum of coefficients on enforcement/(1-sum of coefficient coefficients on lagged wages)). The standard deviation of the long-term effect is calculated using the delta method. See the text for the list of instruments. The F-test on the instruments is for the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly zero in the first-stage regression. The F-test statistic on long-term effect is for the null that the sum of coefficients on border enforcement is zero. The F-test for overidentifying restrictions is for the null that the error term from an IV regression is uncorrelated with the instruments (Newey, 1985) . The Box-Ljung statistic is for a chi-squared test with the null that the residuals are not serially correlated up to six lags (Ljung & Box, 1979 Observations are monthly for March 1980 to September 1996, for a total of 199. The industry wage, which is the dependent variable, is the log real average hourly wage for production workers in Texas. Border enforcement is log officer hours by the U.S. Border Patrol in sectors along the Texas-Mexico border. See notes to table 3 for further details on the regressors and the estimation method.
Using either OLS or instrumental variables, we fail to reject the null that state wages are uncorrelated with border enforcement in any of these industries.
B. California and Texas Border Cities
In the preceding section, the unit of analysis was highimmigrant industries in U.S. border states. Although these are the industries for which illegal immigration is most likely to have an observable impact, using average industry wages may smooth over variation across workers, making the impact of border enforcement on wages difficult to detect. In this section, we adopt an alternative definition of border labor markets. We examine low-education males in California and Texas border cities. We perform a similar series of regressions as those in tables 3 and 4, except that now wages are the age-adjusted mean wage for either high school dropouts or high school graduates in a given region. All other variable definitions, including border enforcement, remain the same. Data limitations restrict the analysis to monthly data for the period from March 1986 to May 1995. Tables 5a and 5b report the results. Observations are monthly for March 1986 to May 1995, for a total of 111. The state wage is the age-adjusted mean wage for males in a given education group in the border region of a given state. (See text for details on the construction of age-adjusted mean wages.) Border enforcement is log officer hours by the U.S. Border Patrol in sectors along the California-Mexico or Texas-Mexico border. The exogenous regressors are the log real wage for the given education group in the United States as a whole, the log real wage for production workers in manufacturing industries in Mexico, the state unemployment rate, a time trend, and monthly dummy variables. All specifications include as regressors two lags on the dependent and independent variables. See notes to table 3 for further details on the estimation method, the instruments used in IV regressions, and the reported test statistics. Observations are monthly for March 1980 to June 1996, for a total of 196. The state wage is the age-adjusted mean wage for males in a given education group in a given state. (See text for details on the construction of age-adjusted mean wages.) Border enforcement is log officer hours by the U.S. Border Patrol in sectors along the California-Mexico or Texas-Mexico border. The regressors are the log real wage for the given education group in the United States as a whole, the log real wage for production workers in manufacturing industries in Mexico, the state unemployment rate, a time trend, and monthly dummy variables. All specifications include as regressors two lags on the dependent and independent variables. See notes to table 3 for further details on the estimation method, the instruments used in IV regressions, and the reported test statistics.
Beginning with OLS regressions, the long-run elasticity of wages with respect to border enforcement, shown in the first row, is negative in California, small and positive in Texas, and imprecisely estimated in all cases. As seen in the second row, we fail to reject the null that there is no long-run correlation between enforcement and wages in all regressions.
Turning to the IV regressions, we first examine the validity of the instruments. In all cases, the instruments are jointly different from zero in the first-stage regression at the 5% level, and we fail to reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors. Similar to the OLS results, in IV regressions the correlation between wages and border enforcement is negative in California, positive in Texas, and imprecisely estimated in all cases. To check the sensitivity of these results, we used several alternative specifications. The results are unaffected by changing lag lengths on the regressors, replacing regional border enforcement with national border enforcement, or including border apprehensions as a regressor.
One concern about the results in table 5a is noise in the constructed wage measures. To increase the sample size and reduce noise in the dependent variable, we performed similar regressions in which we used the age-adjusted mean wage for high school dropouts or high school graduates in either all of California or all of Texas as the dependent variable. The advantage of this approach is that we are able to extend the time period for the analysis to March 1980 to June 1996, which represents an increase of 85 observations. The results are reported in table 5b. The OLS regressions show zero correlation between border enforcement and wages in Texas and a negative correlation in California. The results are confirmed in the IV regressions.
That we estimate a negative correlation between border wages and border enforcement using wages constructed from CPS data contrasts with the results we obtain using BLS industry average wages. As indicated earlier, one concern is that measurement error in the constructed wage measures from CPS data may contaminate the regression results and somehow lead to downward bias in the estimated impact of enforcement on wages, in which case the results in tables 5a and 5b would underestimate the impact of enforcement on wages. Our concerns about compositional bias in average industry wages suggest that the results in tables 3 and 4 may overestimate the impact of enforcement on wages. Taking either set of results, there is little evidence that border enforcement significantly raises rages in U.S. border regions.
In light of these results, we would expected there to be zero correlation between border wages and border enforcement for more-educated workers in California and Texas. In appendix table A3, we report regression results in which the dependent variable is the age-adjusted mean wage for workers with thirteen to fifteen years of education (some college) or sixteen plus years of education (college graduates). For either OLS or IV regressions, we again fail to reject the null to zero long-run correlation between wages and border enforcement for these two categories of workers in either the border areas of California and Texas or in the states as a whole.
C. Mexican Border Cities
Although the effects of border enforcement are negligible in U.S. border regions, it is possible that U.S. border enforcement may have large effects on labor markets in Mexican border regions. Mexican border cities are the transit point for most undocumented Mexican immigrants, and changes in border enforcement could influence local labor supplies in these areas. We examine the two largest Mexican border cities, which are also the major border crossing points for illegal immigrants: Tijuana, which neighbors San Diego, and Ciudad Juarez, which neighbors El Paso.
The empirical specification mirrors that in previous sections. The main difference is that the frequency is quarterly, rather than monthly, due to the availability of Mexican wage data. The dependent variable is the age-adjusted mean wage for Mexican males with either primary (zero to six years) or secondary (seven to eleven years) education. Enforcement is summed into quarters to match the frequency of the wage data. Additional control variables are the log U.S. average hourly real wage for the corresponding education group in the United States, the age-adjusted mean wage for the corresponding education group in interior Mexican cities, quarterly dummy variables, and a time trend. 30 The data cover the period 1987:1 to 1997:4. Table 6 reports OLS estimation results in the upper panel and IV estimation results in the lower panel.
The OLS results indicate that there is a negative correlation between U.S. border enforcement and Mexican wages. This effect is large but imprecisely estimated for all cases but workers with a primary education in Tijuana. For loweducation workers in Tijuana, the long-run elasticity of wages with respect to border enforcement is Ϫ0.347 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. The elasticity estimates for the other groups range from Ϫ0.028 (secondary education, Ciudad Juarez) to Ϫ0.455 (primary education, Ciudad Juarez).
Turning to the IV results, the instruments we use for border enforcement are number of periods until a U.S. congressional election, number of periods until a U.S. presidential election, the U.S. customs user fee, Los Angeles port activity, U.S. travelers to and from Canada, and the number of U.S. federal workdays. All are at a quarterly frequency. In all cases, the instruments pass the F-test and the test of overidentifying restrictions. Applying instrumental variables reduces the magnitude of three of the four elasticity estimates. For low-education workers in Tijuana, the elasticity of wages with respect to enforcement is Ϫ0.307 and is significant at the 10% level. It is not surprising to find the largest effects of enforcement for loweducation workers, as these workers appear to be the most likely to migrate. It is also sensible that the strongest effects are for Tijuana, which is the major crossing point for illegal immigrants over the sample period. That border enforcement is negatively correlated with wages in Mexican border cities is consistent with the idea that greater enforcement restricts immigration and increases the supply of labor in Mexican border cities, putting downward pressure on local wages.
Turning to robustness checks on the results, the magnitude of the long-run effect for Tijuana increases somewhat when additional lags on the regressors are added (although adding regressors also raises standard errors). We also experimented with including the real exchange rate as a regressor and examining results for other large Mexican border cities. Including the real exchange rate does not affect the results qualitatively. The other border cities we examine are Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo, which, over the sample period, were not primary points for illegal entry into the United States. Unsurprisingly, we find no significant correlation between border enforcement and Mexican wages in either city. We also analyzed the effect of border enforcement on the wages of high-education workers. Results for these regressions are given in appendix table A4. The long-run effect of border enforcement on wages is negative, but imprecisely estimated in all cases.
V. Discussion
In this paper, we examine the correlation between enforcement of the U.S.-Mexico border and wages in U.S. and Mexican border regions. For high-immigrant industries in California and Texas, we find a positive long-run impact of border enforcement on wages for one industry only, lumber, and even in this case the magnitude of the impact is quite small. We find no positive effects whatsoever for loweducation males in the border regions of either state. For Mexico, the impact of U.S. border enforcement is larger. We find a moderate negative impact of border enforcement on wages for males with primary education in Tijuana, which is where a large fraction of attempts at illegal entry occur over the sample period.
Our results are consistent with two alternative hypotheses. One is that border enforcement has a minimal impact on illegal immigration. In this case, it would still be possible that illegal immigration puts downward pressure on wages in U.S. border regions, but, because border enforcement does not impede illegal immigration, we would find no correlation between enforcement and wages in U.S. border regions. We find this interpretation implausible. That wages in Tijuana decline following increases in border enforcement suggests that border enforcement does influence border labor markets, if only in Mexico and not the United States. Additionally, there is abundant evidence that, when border enforcement increases at one part of the border, attempts at illegal entry, and hence apprehensions, increase along other parts of the border. (See figures 1 and 2.) Substitution between border crossing sites indicates that at the margin prospective immigrants are deterred by higher Observations are quarterly from 1987:1 to 1997:4, for a total of 43. The wage is the age-adjusted mean wage for males in a given education group in a given city. Border enforcement is log officer hours by the U.S. Border Patrol in sectors along the U.S.-Mexico border that correspond to each Mexican border city. The exogenous regressors are log real industry wages in interior Mexican cities, log real wages for U.S. workers in the corresponding education group, a time trend, and quarterly dummy variables. All specifications include as regressors one lag on the dependent and independent variables. The top panel reports OLS results, and the bottom panel reports IV results, both with Huber-White standard errors. The long-run effect is the estimated long-run elasticity of state wages with respect to border enforcement. See the text for the list of instruments. See notes to table 3 for additional details on the estimation method and the reported test statistics. levels of border enforcement (Bean et al., 1994) . Graphic illustrations of this fact are in unfortunate abundance. Following recent increases in border enforcement at the traditional crossing points of San Diego, El Centro, and El Paso, more immigrants have attempted to enter the United States by crossing the Sonoran desert into Arizona. There has been a corresponding surge in deaths among those attempting illegal entry.
A second interpretation of our results is that border enforcement does deter illegal immigrants but that illegal immigration has a minimal impact on labor markets in U.S. border regions. We believe this to be the more defensible conclusion. There are two ways in which border regions may adjust to influxes of illegal immigrants without large changes in wages. The first is that, given an immigrant influx, U.S. natives may leave border regions or be deterred from moving to border regions. Filer (1992) and Borjas et al. (1997) provide evidence in support of this view. The second is that border economies over time may shift towards industries that are relatively intensive in the use of the skills of arriving immigrants. Hanson and Slaughter (2000) find evidence in support of this view for California.
Border enforcement remains the centerpiece of U.S. policy on illegal immigration. The costs and benefits of this strategy are currently the subject of intense debate. The results in this paper suggest that concerns about the wage impact of illegal immigration have been exaggerated. Although our results do not imply that eliminating border enforcement would leave labor markets in U.S. border areas unaffected, over the range of values for which we observe variation in border enforcement we detect no benefits for U.S. border communities in terms of higher wages. , except that the dependent variable is now the age-adjusted mean wage for workers with either twelve to fifteen years of schooling or fifteen plus years of schooling in a given city. Other details of the estimation are identical to that described in the notes to table 6.
APPENDIX
